LLMPrompt AC.L2-3.1.4
I am a cybersecurity manager working for an organization that is a DoD contractor. I need to implement various security practices that conform to DoD's CMMC program at level 2. The CMMC program stipulates security practices that are based on NIST Special Publication 800-171 R2. For each security practice of CMMC Level 2, I need to show evidence that my organization is in compliance with CMMC. Each security practice has a security requirement and several assessment objectives that support that high-level security requirement.
I am assessing one of the assessment objectives within the practice AC.L2-3.1.4 "SEPARATION OF DUTIES." The CMMC program has published the following assessment guidance, so take them into account as you formulate your response. Also refer to the attached CMMC Level 2 Assessment Guide for more context and information about the practice.
A. SECURITY REQUIREMENT: Separate the duties of individuals to reduce the risk of malevolent activity without collusion.
B. ASSESSMENT OBJECTIVES [NIST SP 800-171A]: Determine if: [a] the duties of individuals requiring separation are defined; [b] responsibilities for duties that require separation are assigned to separate individuals; and [c] access privileges that enable individuals to exercise the duties that require separation are granted to separate individuals.
C. ASSESSMENT APPROACH AND OBJECTS: I have three assessment approaches for assessing any security practice. They are listed as follows:
C1. Examine: The process of checking, inspecting, reviewing, observing, studying, or analyzing one or more assessment objectives to facilitate understanding, achieve clarification, or obtain evidence. The results are used to support the determination of security safeguard existence, functionality, correctness, completeness, and potential for improvement over time.
C2. Interview: The process of conducting discussion with individuals or groups of individuals in an organization to facilitate understanding, achieve clarification, or lead to the location of evidence. The results are used to support the determination of security safeguard existence, functionality, correctness, completeness, and potential for improvement over time.
C3. Test: The process of exercising one or more assessment objects under specified conditions to compare actual with expected behavior. The results are used to support the determination of security safeguard existence, functionality, correctness, completeness, and potential for improvement over time.
D. ASSESSMENT OBJECTS: Each assessment approach can yield potential assessment objects:
D1. Examine: [SELECT FROM: Access control policy; procedures addressing divisions of responsibility and separation of duties; system security plan; system configuration settings and associated documentation; list of divisions of responsibility and separation of duties; system access authorizations; system audit logs and records; other relevant documents or records].
D2. Interview: [SELECT FROM: Personnel with responsibilities for defining divisions of responsibility and separation of duties; personnel with information security responsibilities; system or network administrators].
D3. Test: [SELECT FROM: Mechanisms implementing separation of duties policy].
The previously mentioned assessment objects should help to support the recommended evidence.
E. DISCUSSION: Separation of duties addresses the potential for abuse of authorized privileges and helps to reduce the risk of malevolent activity without collusion. Separation of duties includes dividing mission functions and system support functions among different individuals or roles; conducting system support functions with different individuals (e.g., configuration management, quality assurance and testing, system management, programming, and network security);and ensuring that security personnel administering access control functions do not also administer audit functions. Because separation of duty violations can span systems and application domains, organizations consider the entirety of organizational systems and system components when developing policy on separation of duties.
F. FURTHER DISCUSSION: No one person should be in charge of an entire critical task from beginning to end. Documenting and dividing elements of important duties and tasks between employees reduces intentional or unintentional execution of malicious activities.
G. Examples:
G1. Example 1: You are responsible for the management of several key systems within your organization. You assign the task of reviewing the system logs to two different people. This way, no one person is solely responsible for the execution of this critical security function [c].
G2. Example 2: You are a system administrator. Human Resources notifies you of a new hire, and you create an account with general privileges, but you are not allowed to grant access to systems that contain CUI [a,b]. The program manager contacts the team in your organization that has system administration authority over the CUI systems and informs them which CUI the new hire will need to access. Subsequently, a second system administrator grants access privileges to the new hire [c].
H. Potential Assessment Considerations: Does system documentation identify the system functions or processes that require separation of duties (e.g., function combinations that represent a conflict of interest or an over-allocation of security privilege for one individual) [a]?
I. EVIDENCE TYPES: Finally, I have four evidence types that I can collect. The definitions of the evidence types are as follows:
I1. Artifacts: Tangible and reviewable records that are the direct outcome of a practice or process being performed by a system, person, or persons performing a role in that practice, control, or process. (See CAP Glossary for additional details.)
I2. Document: Any tangible thing which constitutes or contains information and means the original and any copies (whether different from the originals because of notes made on such copies or otherwise) of all writing of every kind and description over which an agency has authority. (See CAP Glossary for additional details.)
I3. Physical Review: An on-premise observation of Evidence.
I4. Screen Share: Live observation ""over the shoulder"" of a user as they share their computer screen while performing a task.
J. KEY REFERENCES: NIST SP 800-171 Rev 2 3.1.4